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We analyze the size-dependence and temporal stability of firm bankruptcy risk in the US economy by applying
Zipf scaling techniques. We focus on a single risk factor—the debt-to-asset ratio R—in order to study the
stability of the Zipf distribution of R over time. We find that the Zipf exponent increases during market crashes,
implying that firms go bankrupt with larger values ofR. Based on the Zipf analysis, we employ Bayes’ theorem
and relate the conditional probability that a bankrupt firm has a ratio R with the conditional probability of
bankruptcy for a firm with a given R value. For 2,737 bankrupt firms, we demonstrate size-dependence in
assets change during the bankruptcy proceedings. Pre-petition firm assets and petition firm assets follow Zipf
distributions but with different exponents, meaning that firms with smaller assets adjust their assets more than
firms with larger assets during the bankruptcy process. We compare bankrupt firms with non-bankrupt firms
by analyzing the assets and liabilities of two large subsets of the US economy: 2,545 Nasdaq members and
1,680 NYSE members. We find that both assets and liabilities follow a Pareto distribution. This is not a
trivial consequence of the Zipf scaling relationship of firm size quantified by employees—while the market
capitalization of Nasdaq stocks follows a Pareto distribution, this is not true for NYSE stocks. We propose a
coupled Simon model that simultaneously evolves both assets and debt with the possibility of bankruptcy, and
we also consider the possibility of firm mergers.
Complex systems are commonly coupled together and
therefore should be considered and modeled as interdepen-
dent. It is important to study the conditions of interaction
which may lead to mutual failure, the indicators of such fail-
ure, and the behavior of the indicators in times of crisis. As
an indicator of economic failure, default risk is defined as the
probability that a borrower cannot meet his or her financial
obligations, i.e. cannot make principal and/or interest pay-
ments [1, 2]. Accordingly, it is important to better understand
default risk [1–12] and its relation to firm growth [13–18], and
how they behave in times of crisis.
In describing both natural and social phenomena, size-
dependent scaling is an essential technique for understanding
the common relations between large and small scales. One
reason for the importance of scaling relationships is that they
capture salient, robust features of a system. Sala-i-Martin
found by analyzing the scaling relation between GDP growth
rates and initial GDP over the thirty-year period 1960–1990
that poor countries grow slower than rich countries [19]. Size-
dependent scaling of the standard deviations of firm growth
rates and country growth rates are reported in [20] and [21].
In finance, Fama and French demonstrated that market risk
depends upon the firm size [22].
We find that book values of assets and debt of the U.S. com-
panies that filed for bankruptcy in the past twenty years fol-
low a Zipf scaling (power-law) distribution. The same is true
for the values of assets and debt of non-bankrupt firms com-
prising the Nasdaq. We focus our attention on a single risk
indicator, the debt-to-asset ratio R, in order to analyze stabil-
ity of the scaling exponent or establish crossover regions. In
order to capture Pareto and Zipf laws, the literature has typ-
ically focused on a single Simon model [13, 14, 16–18] de-
scribing a single dynamic system which does not interact with
others. We model the growth of debt and asset values using
two dependent (coupled) Simon models with two parameters
only, bankruptcy rate and another parameter controlling debt-
to-asset ratio. The Zipf law scaling predictions of the coupled
Simon model are consistent with our empirical findings.
I. DATA ANALYZED
Our dataset consists of medium-size and large U.S.
companies that filed for bankruptcy protection in the pe-
riod 1990–2009. We obtain our data from the URL
www.BankruptcyData.com, one of the most compre-
hensive bankruptcy dataset currently available on the
web. There is also a bankruptcy data set available at
http://bdp.law.harvard.edu/fellows.cfm, but with smaller
firms and no debt data. Our dataset includes data on 2,737
public and private firms. The book value of firm assets in the
database ranges from 50 million to almost 700 billion USD.
A. For each firm in our sample we know the pre-petition
book value of firm assets Aa and the effective date of
bankruptcy. From the court petition documents we find
the petition book value of firm assets Ab, as well as
book value of total debt, Db. As an example Lehman
Brothers filled a petition on September 15, 2008, list-
ing the debt Db and assets Ab on May 31, 2008. Thus,
Ab, Aa, and Db quantify the debtor’s condition before
declaring bankruptcy. We are able to obtain Ab and
debt Db for 462 firms. Note that Refs. [5], [6], and
[12] studied 53, 105, and 585 bankrupt firms, respec-
tively. There is often a substantial change in the debt
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2and assets of a company in the time period preceding
bankruptcy. Hence for each firm we calculate the debt-
to-assets (leverage ratio)
R ≡ Db/Ab, (1)
from the total debt Db and assets Ab estimated simulta-
neously. Note that economics has a parallel treatment,
known as Tobin’s Q theory of investment which also
focuses on a single factor, Q [23].
In the literature on ratio analysis [4, 6, 8], multi-
ple financial ratios are used for predicting probability
of default, such as the ratio of total liabilities to total
assets. Adding more factors would likely improve the
predictive power of the model, so we consider only one
risk factor, namely the debt-to-assets ratioRwhich cap-
tures the level of company indebtedness. We do this for
two reasons: (a) to make a model as simple as possible,
and (b) in order to simplify our study regarding whether
market crashes and global recessions affect the scaling
existing in bankruptcy data. In order to relate the prob-
ability of bankruptcy to R, we analyze the scaling rela-
tions that quantify the probability distribution of firms
that entered into bankruptcy proceedings with particu-
lar values of Ab and R. Our analysis includes very few
number of young start-up firms, for which the age of
the firm also factors into the probability of bankruptcy
in addition to R. In 2009 we find that the average life-
time of the 215 bankrupt firms analyzed was 35.8±33.9
years, and the minimum lifetime was 3 years.
B. We analyze market capitalization, assets and liabilities
of 2,545 firms traded on the Nasdaq over the three-year
period from 2006 to 2008. We also analyze assets and
liabilities of 1,680 firms traded on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) in the period from 2007 to 2009.
Also, we analyze market capitalization of NYSE mem-
bers over the period 2002-2007.
II. QUANTITATIVE METHODS
Our analysis is closely related to the literature on firm
size [24, 25]. Analyzing data from the U.S. Census Bureau,
Ref. [25] reported that firm sizes of the U.S. firms follow a
Zipf law: the number of firms larger than size s is s−ζ , where
ζ ' 1. The Zipf distribution is found for the distribution of
city sizes [27] and the distribution of firm sizes [25, 28].
The cumulative distribution is a simple transformation of
the Zipf rank-frequency relation, where the observations xi
are ordered according to rank r from largest (r ≡ 1) to small-
est. For Pareto-distributed variables s with cumulative distri-
bution P (s > x) ∼ x−ζ′ , the Zipf plot of size s versus rank r
exhibits a power-law scaling regime with the scaling exponent
ζ, where
ζ = 1/ζ ′. (2)
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FIG. 1: Zipf plot of U.S. bankrupted firm assets. (a) Zipf plot calcu-
lated for firms over the last 20 years between pre-petition total assets,
Aa versus rank. Deviation from the Zipf law is due to the fact that
the data set includes mainly the firms with assets larger than 50 mil-
lion dollars (dotted line). (b) Zipf plot of U.S. bankrupted firms of
debt versus rank—462 firms in total—along with Zipf plot of book
value asset and rank. The two plots practically overlap.
III. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS
Figure 1(a) shows the Zipf plot for pre-petition book value
of assets Aa. The data are approximately linear in a log-log
plot with the exponent
ζa = 1.11± 0.01, (3)
obtained using the OLS regression method. For the U.S.
data on firm size (measured by the number of employees),
Ref. [25] reported the value ζ ≈ 1. Hence, prior to filing
for bankruptcy protection, the book value of firm assets for
companies that later underwent bankruptcy satisfies a scaling
relation similar to that in [25]. The firms with a rank larger
than ≈ 500 start to deviate from the Zipf law, a result of finite
size effects as found in data on firm size [25].
It is known that the market equity of firms that are close
to bankruptcy is typically discounted by traders [10, 12]. In
order to study if those changes are size-dependent during the
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FIG. 2: (a) Zipf plot of market capitalization M versus rank r for
the Nasdaq members for each year of 6 years. We find practically
the same Zipf law for the largest 1,000 companies as we find for the
assets Aa of bankrupted firms in Fig. 1(b). (b) For the Nasdaq firms
both assets and liabilities follow a Zipf plot. (c) Book value of equity
of stock traded at Nasdaq, defined as assets less liabilities, follows a
Zipf law.
time of bankruptcy, we test whether there is a difference in
scaling behavior between pre-petition and petition firm assets.
Figure 1 B ranks the firm book value of assets Ab and firm
debt Db. We find
ζb = ζD = 1.44± 0.01. (4)
Also, a Zipf law is found for the distribution of total liabilities
of bankrupted firms in Japan [29, 30].
We obtain that ζb > ζa, a discrepancy that could be of po-
tential practical interest. To clarify this point, if Ab is related
to Aa by a constant Ab/Aa ≡ c, we would observe ζa = ζb.
However, we observe an increasing relation Aa/Ab ∝ rζb−ζa
with rank r, meaning that bankrupt firms with smaller Aa
have larger relative adjustments than do bankrupt firms with
larger Ab. By using a method proposed in Ref. [31] we obtain
ζb = 1.39, close to the exponent we found in Eq. (4).
Our analysis of bankruptcy probability is, due to data lim-
itation, based on book values. One may argue that a more
relevant analysis would be based on market values of assets
and liabilities. We now demonstrate that using market instead
of book values may in fact lead to similar results. For this
purpose, let us consider companies for which we have both
market and book value data, namely stocks that comprise the
Nasdaq. We begin by finding market capitalization of Nas-
daq members for each year from 2002 to 2007. The data
are available at www.bloomberg.com. Figure 2(a) shows the
Zipf plot for market capitalization deflated to 2002 dollar val-
ues. We find that the market capitalization versus rank for the
largest ≈ 1, 000 companies is well described by a Zipf law
with exponent ζM = 1.1± 0.02, in agreement with Ref. [32].
In Fig. 2(b) we repeat the Zipf analysis using, this time,
book values of both assets and debt for the same Nasdaq
stocks. The scaling exponents we observe in Fig. 2(b) are
larger than the exponent observed in Fig. 2(a). However, mar-
ket capitalization is best compared with book value of equity
E ≡ A−D, rather than assets A. In Fig. 2(c) we find that E
also exhibits Zipf scaling with exponent ζE = 1.02 ± 0.01,
which is more similar to ζM . Therefore, we find qualita-
tively similar scaling for the existing Nasdaq companies and
for companies before they entered into bankruptcy proceed-
ings.
The probability of bankruptcy P (R) is a natural proxy for
firm distress [10]. Previous studies analyzed defaults of firms
traded at NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq [10]. In contrast, the
majority of firms in our dataset are privately held companies.
For bankrupt firms in Fig. 3(a) we show P (R|B) for values of
the debt-to-assets ratio 0 < R < 4. We truncate data to avoid
outliers as in Ref. [11]. We find P (R|B) is right-skewed with
a maximum at R ≈ 1, and 〈R〉 = 1.4± 1.5.
Previous studies find that bankruptcy risk of NYSE and
AMEX stocks is negatively related to firm size [10]. In or-
der to test for firm-size dependence of bankruptcy risk for
mainly private firms using BankruptcyData.com with R as
bankruptcy measure, we divide theR values into two subsam-
ples based on their value of Ab. In Fig. 3(a) we demonstrate
qualitatively that R is size-dependent. The pdfs for small Ab
and largeAb are similar in that they both show peaks atR ≈ 1.
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FIG. 3: Bankruptcy risk based on petition book value asset Ab
and debt Db. (a) We find the distribution of R = Db/Ab for the
bankrupted firms. One may calculate the probability that a firm with
a given ratio R will go bankrupt when its ratio is ≤ R. (b) For the
ratio values 3 > R > 0.8 (67% of all data), we show the Zipf plot
that can be approximated by a Pareto distribution with ζR = 0.57.
The same regime we fit with the power-law tail of pdf and obtain
0.79R−2.72 where the exponent ζ′ + 1 = 2.73 is in agreement (see
Eq. (2)) with the Zipf exponent ζ = 0.57. For the largest ratio values
R > 3 (7% of all data), we find a crossover to a power-law regime
with ζR = 1.58.
However, firms with smaller assets, as measured by Ab, have
a larger probability of high debt-to-assets ratios R than firms
with large assets Ab.
In addition, we test for the size-dependence by performing
the Mann-Whitney U-test, which quantifies the difference be-
tween the two populations based on the difference between
the asset ranks of the two samples. (The null hypothesis is
that the distributions are the same). Since the test statistics U-
value = −5.60, we reject the null hypothesis thus confirming
that R depends on Ab at the p = 0.05 confidence level.
In Fig. 3(b) we analyze the Zipf scaling for large R. We
find that the Zipf plot can be approximated by two power-law
regimes. For ≈ 300 firms with 0.8 < R < 3 (regime I),
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FIG. 4: Zipf plot of debt-to-assets ratio R and rank r for the existing
firms of the Nasdaq members over the last 3 years. For the ≈ 300
ratio values smaller than 3.5 and larger than 0.95 the Zipf plot has
exponent 0.37. The same regime we fit with the power-law tail of
pdf and obtain 1.54R−3.6 where the exponent ζ′ = 3.6 agrees [see
Eq. (2)] with the Zipf exponent ζ = 0.37.
we find a power-law regime with ζR = 0.57 ± 0.02. Hence,
according to Eq. (2) we conclude that the cumulative distribu-
tion of dangerously highR values of bankrupt firms decreases
faster with ζ ′ ≈ 1.72 for large R than the distribution of firm
size [25] and firm assets with ζ ′ ≈ 1 (see Fig. 1). For R > 3
(7% of all data including predominantly financial firms), we
find that the Zipf plot exhibits a significant crossover behavior
to a power-law regime with ζ ≈ 1.58.
The conditional probability P (B|R) that an existing firm
with debt-to-assets ratio R will file for bankruptcy protection
may be of significance to rating agencies, creditors, and in-
vestors. According to Bayes theorem, P (B|R) depends on
P (R|B) (see Fig. 3), P (B), the probability of bankruptcy for
existing firms, and P (R) where as a proxy for the existing
companies we use companies constituting the Nasdaq in the 3-
year period between 2007–2009. For this time period we ob-
tain book value of each firm’s assets and liabilities (the latter
serving as a proxy for total debt). As a result we obtain 7,635
R values with median value 0.48. For existing Nasdaq mem-
bers, Fig. 4 shows that the Zipf plot can be approximated by
two power-law regimes, where regime I with 3.5 > R > 0.9
yields ζe = 0.37 ± 0.01. Note that regime I is similar to the
one we find in Fig. 3(b) for bankruptcy data. P (B) may sub-
stantially change during economic crises. Interestingly, Ref.
[26] analyzes the debt-to-GDP (gross domestic product) ratio
for countries, in analogy to the debt-to-assets ratio for existing
firms, and calculates a Zipf scaling exponent that is approxi-
mately the same as the scaling exponent calculated here for
existing Nasdaq firms.
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FIG. 5: Zipf plot of debt-to-assets ratio R versus rank r for the
bankrupt firms for the three different 3-year subperiods. During the
last three years characterized by recession the Zipf plot exhibits a
crossover behavior. A smaller crossover in the Zipf plot also exists
for the period 2001–2003 characterized by the dot-com bubble burst.
We estimate the scaling of P (B|R) using Bayes’ theorem,
P (B|R) = P (R|B)P (B)
P (R)
≈ 0.51 P (B)R1/ζe−1/ζR
≈ 0.51 P (B) R0.95 (5)
where we approximate P (R|B) and P (R) with power laws—
P (R|B) ∼ R−(1/ζR+1)∆R and P (R) ∼ R−(1/ζe+1)∆R.
The value of the relevant exponents calculated for regime I
are: ζe ≈ 0.37 (see Fig. 4) and ζR = 0.57 [see Fig. 3(b)],
where ζR > ζe implies that P (B|R) increases with firm in-
debtedness quantified byR. The pre-factor 0.51 calculated for
the regime I we estimate from the corresponding intercepts in
pdfs [see Figs. 3(b) and 4]. In Fig. 4 we find a pronounced
crossover in the Zipf plot for very large values of the R ratio.
In order to test whether market crash and global reces-
sion have significant effects on the scaling we find in the
bankruptcy data, in Fig. 5 we analyze the Zipf scaling of the
large R values for three different 3-year periods. For the pe-
riod 2004–2006 we find a stable Zipf plot characterized by an
exponent ζR = 0.50 ± 0.01 close to the value we found in
Fig. 3(b) for all years analyzed. For the period 2001–2003
characterized by the dot-com bubble burst, we find a less pro-
nounced crossover in the Zipf plot between regime I with ex-
ponent ζR = 0.58± 0.01 and regime II. For the period 2007–
2009 we find that the Zipf plot exhibits a significant crossover
behavior between regime I and regime II.
Figure 5 demonstrates the existence of a relatively stable
scaling exponent (between 0.5 and 0.6) in regime I over the
9-year period 2001-2009. However, in times of economic cri-
sis, e.g., the period 2007–2009, the exponent in regime I in-
creases, implying that firms go bankrupt with larger values
of R. According to Eq. (5), in times of crisis (ζR ≈ 0.6)
P (B|R) ∝ R1/ζe−1/ζR ∝ R1 shifts upward compared to
times of relative stability (ζR ≈ 0.5) when P (B|R) ∝ R0.7.
A crossover in scaling exponents may be useful for under-
standing asset bubbles.
IV. A MODEL
Our results complement both the literature on default risk as
well as the literature on firm growth. According to a study of
U.S. firm dynamics, over 65% of the 500 largest U.S. firms in
1982 no longer existed as independent entities by 1996 [33].
To explain how firms develop, expand and then cease to exist,
Jovanovic proposed a theory of selection where the key is firm
efficiency; efficient firms grow and survive and the inefficient
decline and, eventually, fail [15]. Many models have been pro-
posed to model default risk [1, 2, 34–37]. One strain of that
literature [34] develops structural models of credit risk. In
these models, risky debt is modeled within an option-pricing
framework where an underlying asset is the value of company
assets. Bankruptcy occurs endogenously when the value of
company assets is insufficient to cover obligations. In con-
trast, in reduced form models [2] default is modeled exoge-
nously.
In order to reproduce the Zipf law that holds for bankrupt
firms, we propose a coupled Simon model, an extension of
the Simon model used in the theory of firm growth [13, 14,
16–18]. Here we couple the evolution of both asset growth
and debt growth through debt acquisition which depends on a
firms assets, and further impose a bankruptcy condition on a
firm’s assets and debt values at any given time.
Simon rule for assets. The economy begins with one firm
at the initial time t ≡ 1. At each step a new firm with initial
assets A ≡ 1 is added to the economy. With a probability p, a
new firm i is added to the economy as an individual entity at
time ti. With probability 1−p, the new firm i is taken over by
another firm. The probability that firm i is taken over by an
existing firm j is proportional to Aj(t), the number of units
in firm j is equal to (1 − p)Aj(t)/ΣkAk(t). Hence, a larger
firm is more likely to acquire a firm than a smaller firm. In
this expression, the index k runs over all of the existing firms
at time t. We use the value Aj(t) to be the proxy for the value
of assets of the firm j. Simon found a stationary solution ex-
hibiting power-law scaling, P (s > x) ∝ s−ζ′ , with exponent
ζ ′ = 1/(1− p). For an estimate of p one can investigate ven-
ture data to see how venture capitalists dispose of their com-
panies. Even though data suggest p = 0.5 (see [39]), we use
a much smaller value p = 0.01 in oder to reproduce Zipf plot
in Eq. (4).
Simon rule for debt. When a new firm i is created at time
ti, it is assigned debt Di(ti) = m, where 0 < m < 1. For
simplicity we use a single m value for all firms. If an existing
firm j acquires the new assetAi ≡ 1, thenAj(t)−Aj(t−1) =
1, and debtDj(t)−Dj(t−1) = m. Hence, a firm with assets
Aj(t) = N has debt Dj(t) = mN , implying that the debt-to-
assets ratio R = m is the same for all firms.
In order to introduce variation in R ratios across firms, we
assume that at each time ti, a new debt is created in the econ-
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FIG. 6: Model results. (a) Zipf plot of debt-to-assets ratio R versus
rank r for the firms generated by the model (compare with Fig. 4)
when bankruptcy is not included. In order to understand plateaus in
the figure, note that both assets and debt in the model exhibit integer
values. (b) For each asset and debt the Zipf plot displays a power law
R ∼ r−ζ . (c) Zipf plot of R versus rank as a function of bankruptcy
rate parameter q. With decreasing q the slope increases slightly.
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FIG. 7: Scale-free persistence in the Simon model with mergers. Zipf
plot of value Aj(t)—the value of assets of the firm j—versus rank
r for the Simon model with a merger parameter p′ representing the
probability that a pair of firms will merge. With increasing p′, ζ
slowly increases.
omy for some company j, so that Dj(ti) − Dj(ti − 1) = 1.
Hence, for each time step, there is a new firm receiving debt
Di = m in addition to firm j receiving one unit of debt, where
generally i 6= j. The newly created units of debt are acquired
with probability proportional toAj(t). Hence, the Simon laws
controlling the growth of debt Dj(t) and the growth of assets
Aj(t) are coupled. In our model, richer firms become more
indebted, but also acquire new firms with larger probability.
In Fig. 6(a) we perform the numerical simulation of the
model by generating 500,000 Monte-Carlo time steps. We
calculate the Zipf distribution of the debt-to-assets ratio R for
different choices of m. Even though debt and hence R in-
creases with m, the slope of the Zipf plot for R versus rank
practically does not depend on the value of m. Unless stated
otherwise, in other simulations we set m = 0.5.
Following [41], we consider the continuous-time version
of our discrete-time model. In this case Dj(t) and Aj(t) are
continuous real-valued functions of time. Further, we assume
that the rate at which Dj(t) changes in time is proportional
to the assets size Aj(t). Hence, following this assumption,
Dj(t) = (1+m)Aj(t) because of the acquisition of additional
debt. Therefore, since Aj(t) = t/tj [41], then Dj(t) = (1 +
m)t/tj . The cumulative probability that a firm has debt size
Dj(t) smaller than D is, therefore, P (Dj(t) < D) = P (tj >
(1 +m)t/D). In the Simon model we add new firms at equal
time intervals. Thus, each value ti is realized with a constant
probability P (tj) = 1/t. It follows that
P (tj > (1 +m)t/D) = 1− (1 +m)t/Dt = 1− (1 +m)/D.
(6)
Since the parameter t cancels out, the same expression we
obtain when t goes to infinity. This is the Zipf law for debt
in the case when there is no possibility of bankruptcy [see
Eq. (3)].
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FIG. 8: Zipf plot of (a) market capitalizationM versus rank r and (b)
assets and debt versus rank r for the NYSE members for year 2007.
The curve in (a) follows a stretched exponential exp(−rβ/τ) with
β = 0.5 and τ = 45.
Firm bankruptcy. Up to now, debt has been modeled as
riskless. We now introduce bankruptcy into the coupled Si-
mon model. We assume that for each firm there is a likeli-
hood of bankruptcy, which depends on the volatile firm as-
set value [34]. In order to be consistent with our empirical
findings, we assume that the firm j that was created at time
tj files for bankruptcy with probability q R0.95 [see Eq. (6)],
where q is the bankruptcy rate parameter, related to P (B) in
Eq. (6). In the hazard model, the hazard rate is the probabil-
ity of bankruptcy as of time t, conditional upon having sur-
vived until time t [11]. In our model, once firm j files for
bankruptcy, part of its debt is lost (restructured) and the firm
starts anew with debt equal to Dj = mAj . We do not assume
a merger or a liquidation and a firm’s probability of failure
does not depend on its age [11]. Besides bankruptcy, a firm
may leave an industry through merger and voluntary liquida-
tion [9].
Next we perform 500,000 Monte-Carlo time steps for the
model with the possibility of bankruptcy. Fig. 6(b) presents
Zipf distribution for firm asset and debt values for all of
the existing firms. Each of these distributions is in agree-
ment with the Zipf law and Eq. (6). In Fig. 6(c), for the
subset of bankrupt companies, we show the Zipf distribu-
tion for R using three different values of the bankruptcy
rate q. Note that q is supposed to be small. Namely, with
q = 10−7 and with 500,000 time steps representing one year,
500, 000 q represents a probability per year that a company
files for bankruptcy during a period of one year,≈ 0.05 in our
case. This should be compared with the average default rate,
≈ 0.04, calculated in the period 1985–2007 [42]. We see that
model predictions approximately correspond to the empirical
findings.
Our model can be extended in different ways including
mergers between firms. First, while the Simon model assumes
that at each time increment a new unit is added, we can as-
sume that the number of new units grows as a power-law tθ
[38]. By using a continuous-time version of a discrete-time
model we obtain P (Dj(t) < D) = P (tj > (1 + m)t/D) =
1− ( 1+mD )1+θ, where we use P (ti > t0) =
∫ t
t0
dttθ/
∫ t
0
dttθ.
Second, Jovanovic and Rousseau [39] found that mergers con-
tribute more to firm growth than when a firm takes over a small
new entrant. In order to incorporate mergers into the Simon
model, we assume that at each time t, a single merger between
a pair of firms occurs with probability p′, where two firms are
randomly chosen. Reference [40] reported that in more than
two thirds of all mergers since 1973, the Tobin Q value of
the acquisition firm exceeded the Tobin Q value of the target
firm, where Q is Tobin ’s ratio similarly defined as D ratio
in Eq. (1). To this end, we assume that if Aj > Ai when a
merger occurs Aj = Aj + Ai and Ai = 0. Thus, the more-
rich firm j buys the less-rich firm i resulting in the elimination
of firm i as an individual entity. In Fig. 7 we show that the in-
clusion of mergers does not change the scale free nature of the
Simon model. In these simulations we use a varying merger
probability p′, and p = 0.01 with 1,000,000 time steps. With
increasing p′, the Zipf exponent ζ slowly decreases. Note that
with 1,000,000 time steps if p′ = 0.5p, and with p = 0.01,
then approximately 5,000 mergers occur.
V. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
We demonstrate that Zipf scaling techniques may be use-
ful in analyzing bankruptcy risk. We find that book values of
pre-petition and petition company assets systematically differ
from each other and that the difference depends upon com-
pany size. Also, the debt-to-assets ratio R for firms that
filed for bankruptcy has a probability distribution that de-
pends upon the firm size. In analyzing existing (non-bankrupt)
companies we use as a proxy stocks traded at Nasdaq. We
demonstrate that market capitalization as well as book value
of assets, liabilities and equity for the stocks traded at Nasdaq
exhibit Pareto scaling properties. This is not a trivial con-
sequence of the scaling relationship of firm size [25] since
for companies traded at NYSE we do not find similar power-
law scaling for market capitalization [see Fig. 8(a)] and book
value of equity. However, the book value of assets and lia-
bilities for NYSE stocks follows a Pareto law with exponents
that are slightly larger than those we find for Nasdaq stocks
8[see Fig. 8(b)]. Our results reveal a discrepancy in scaling of
market capitalization and book value of equity obtained from
different exchange markets (e.g., Nasdaq and NYSE).
Using our scaling results, we derive a simple expression for
the conditional bankruptcy probability given R. Importantly,
we find that scaling properties for large R values change dur-
ing the periods of significant market turbulence such as the
dot.com bubble crash (2001–2003) and the current global
crisis where scaling exhibits significant cross-over properties.
Change of scaling exponents may, therefore, be of signifi-
cance understanding the asset bubbles.
In order to reproduce our empirical results we model
growth of risky debt and asset values by means of two de-
pendent (coupled) Simon models. Predictions of the coupled
Simon model are consistent with our empirical findings.
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